Why is the United States Increasingly Shifting Towards Protectionist Trade Policies?

Michael Regateiro, Sean Millington, Ethan Madappatt

University at Albany RPOS 496Z: Great Ideas in Political Science

Dr. Zsófia Barta

December 10th, 2024

Introduction:

The United States, a longtime champion of free trade, has taken a rapid shift in recent years towards protectionist trade policies like tariffs. During the Obama administration we were a part of free trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership which Donald Trump pulled us out of, and we have stayed out of ever since. The vast majority of new tariffs have been placed on imported goods coming from China. According to the Brookings institution, before the trade war in June 2018 in the first Trump administration, the tariff rate on imported goods from China were at about 3-4%. At the height of the trade war, U.S. tariffs on Chinese exports went over 20% and has hovered around there through the Biden administration until 2024 when the Biden administration actually increased the tariff rate. (Hass and Meltzer, 2024) Tariffs on goods like semiconductors, battery parts, lithium-ion batteries, electric vehicles, natural graphite, and steel and aluminum products have all remained and gone up in the Biden administration. This rapid shift in economic policy reflects different domestic and geopolitical concerns that have reshaped U.S. trade strategy.

One possible explanation for this is China’s rapid rise as a global power under Xi Jinping whose aggressive foreign policy like increasing the size of the Chinese military and threatening its neighbors, has alarmed U.S. policy makers and could be a reason for the increase in tariffs. Additionally, the Biden Administration's continued implementation of tariff trade policy could be due to the instability COVID-19 caused in global supply chains. This highlighted an overreliance on free trade; therefore, tariffs are being implemented by the Biden Administration to protect supply chains in industries like semiconductors. Finally, the election of Donald Trump in 2016 marked a critical turning point in U.S. trade policy, with the administration embracing an “America first” agenda that prioritized American industries through starting a trade war with China by using tariffs over free trade norms. This paper examines these three hypotheses in detail so we can better understand the underlying reasons for this sudden increase in tariffs. Understanding the factors behind this shift can provide insights into the future direction of U.S. trade policy.

Literature Review:

Think tanks such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Brookings, the Council on Foreign Relations, and government sources like the White House have pointed out that the threat from Chinese military expansion, and recent supply chain issues are reasons for the sudden increase in tariffs. CSIS has conducted multiple studies on Chinese military buildup under Xi Jinping and the threat that poses to Taiwan and semiconductor production showing that Chinese military buildup scares Washington and also threatens our critical technology supply chains. The same supply chains that are used to build our most advanced military equipment. More specifically, CSIS reveals that China has massively built up its navy in the recent decade that Xi Jinping has been the president of China and that this has alarmed American policy makers because they threaten our allies in the pacific. They also more specifically demonstrate that many critical technologies such as semiconductors are made in places like Taiwan and the potential threat of a Chinese invasion would pose a national security threat to the U.S. since those semiconductors are used in our most critical military technology. (CSIS, 2022, 2024) According to the Council on Foreign Relations (Alden, 2024), a primary driver is the increasing competition with China, which has led U.S. policymakers to prioritize protecting strategic industries and limiting China’s economic and technological reach. Tariffs on Chinese goods, in this view, serve as both a defensive and deterrent measure, aiming to curb China’s influence in key sectors like advanced technology, which are vital to U.S. economic and military interests.

The White House Council of Economic Advisers (The White House, 2023) emphasizes that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed critical vulnerabilities in global supply chains, showcasing the risks of excessive dependence on foreign suppliers for essential resources. This experience has reinforced the U.S. government’s focus on domestic resilience, with tariffs acting as a tool to encourage investment in national supply chains for critical goods such as semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. Both sources indicate that this reorientation reflects a shift toward economic nationalism, with the U.S. adopting tariffs to protect its economic sovereignty and bolster strategic industries, marking a notable departure from previous policies favoring free trade and open markets.

Methodology:

We conducted a review of primary sources that includes government documents, policy reports, and statements from the Office of the United States Trade Representative and the U.S. International Trade Commission, to identify the economic and strategic motivations behind these policy changes. In addition, we also used secondary literature from academic sources, think tanks, and industry analyses to contextualize the impact of global events, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic and geopolitical tensions with China, on U.S. trade strategies. By synthesizing these sources, we examined how the distinct approaches and rhetoric of both administrations converge on a protectionist policy trajectory. This methodology allowed us to better explore the underlying drivers of recent trade policy shifts and help assess the rationale for the policy’s persistence across two presidential administrations.

Hypothesis 1:

For our first hypothesis we argue that Xi Jinping’s aggressive foreign policy, characterized by military expansion, assertive actions in the South China Sea, and growing economic influence, has alarmed U.S. foreign policy officials. In response, the U.S. has rapidly imposed tariffs on China to counter its rising power, aiming to weaken China’s economy and deter further military and geopolitical advancements. For instance, the U.S. has imposed tariffs on Chinese semiconductors, citing national security concerns over China’s access to advanced technologies critical for military and surveillance capabilities. This reflects the U.S.’s strategic focus on limiting China’s technological, economic, and military advancements through economic leverage. By numerically analyzing China’s massive military buildup that is threatening U.S. partners like Taiwan, China bringing more countries into their economic sphere of influence, and their technological advancements, we should be able to properly test the validity of our hypothesis.

The first area of Chinese military buildup we want to look at is Chinese naval buildup. There is a real possibility that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) may overtake the U.S. Navy in certain measures sooner than we may expect. This will result in China being able to project more military power in East Asia, threatening countries like Taiwan, and ignoring U.S. efforts to deter their behavior. Below is a chart from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) study, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” that demonstrates the number of naval ships that China has been building since 2003. (CSIS, 2024)

A part of our hypothesis is that this Chinese military buildup has mostly began after the election of Xi Jinping in late 2012 and early 2013. As shown in this graph around the time that Xi Jinping became General Secretary and the President, China started to build more ships rapidly. In 2012, China had 0 corvettes, which is a class of warship that are used to support and defend large naval fleets. In 2018, during the Trump administration China had built 41 corvettes in just five years. This graph shows that at the end of the first Trump administration China had overtaken the United States in the number of warships its navy has, making it the largest naval force in the world. Some other numbers this study shows is as of today, China now operates 234 warships, and the U.S. operates 219. This article also shows that China is rapidly closing the gap between the number of destroyers these two countries have. A destroyer is a large battleship designed to take out large naval fleets. Currently the United States has 73 destroyers and China has 42, doesn’t seem too worrying at first. However, China has doubled its destroyer fleet since 2003 and in the last 10 years since the election of Xi Jinping, China has launched 23 destroyers, and the United States has only launched 11. China has also launched eight cruisers since 2017, while the U.S. has not launched a cruiser since 2016. Below is another graph from this article that shows the large disparity between Chinese naval ship launching and U.S. naval ship launching. (CSIS, 2024)

This graph further helps our hypothesis by showing that since around 2010-2014 which is when Xi Jinping was elected, there has been a huge disparity between U.S. naval ship building and Chinese naval ship building. From 2010 up until around the trade war during the first Trump term, China has built around 100 more naval vessels than the U.S. as shown in this graph. This article gives us more numbers on this phenomenon. It states, “China’s productive advantage is reflected in the relative ages of active Chinese and U.S. ships. About 70 percent of Chinese warships were launched after 2010, while only about 25 percent of the U.S. Navy’s were.” The U.S. Navy had also reported that China has 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States. If a war were to break out between the United States and China this massive shipbuilding industry would give China a major strategic advantage. (CSIS, 2024)

It’s also not just the navy China is building up. China has also made massive military advancements in its air force. In Simpleflying’s article, “How many fighter jets does China produce annually,” it shows the U.S. produces around 222 F-16, F-18, F-15, and F-35 fighter jets per year. These are the four fighter jets the United States has in production. China on the other hand produces 240 new fighter jets per year. They also report that China produces 100 J-20 Mighty Dragons (a fifth-generation stealth fighter) per year where the U.S. produces 135 fifthgeneration stealth fighters per year however, around 60-70 of those are going abroad to different countries so China is adding more to their air force on a yearly basis. (Aaron Spray, 2024)

Some Statista data sets also help support this hypothesis. One data set shows that China has doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal ever since the election of Xi Jinping. In the year 2013 China had 250 nuclear weapons and now in 2024 according to the Federation of American Scientists they have 500. (O’Neill, 2024) (Hans Kristensen et. al., 2024) Below is a graph from Statista that shows the ballooning of the Chinese military budget after Xi Jinping was elected as General Secretary and President. (Statista, 2024)

This massive military buildup poses a big threat to American allies in the pacific, particularly Taiwan. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, China has invested heavily in advanced military capabilities like modernizing its navy and air force. For Taiwan, which Beijing considers a breakaway province, this buildup is especially alarming not just to Taiwan but to the United States as well. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) expansion has strained the security dynamics of the region, compelling the United States and its allies to rethink its deterrence strategies. It is becoming evident that China has plans to retake the island and reunite it with the mainland.

The U.S. is reliant on Taiwan to build semiconductor chips which are used to power all of the U.S.’s most advanced military systems. In a study done by the Center for Strategic and International Studies called, “Semiconductors and National Defense, what are the Stakes,” they state, “U.S. dependency on Taiwanese production of chips for defense systems extends beyond artificial intelligence (AI). The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) makes semiconductors used in F-35 fighters and a wide range of ‘military grade’ devices used by the Department of Defense.” They also state, “Semiconductors present in the latest Apple smartphones, 5G communication systems, graphics cards, and data center processors are all designed in the United States, but only TSMC has the capacity to manufacture them.” If China were to invade Taiwan this would pose a massive national security threat to the United States because China would be able to get access to the technology that goes into our most advanced weapons and infrastructure. (CSIS, 2022)

U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan gave a speech in 2023 at the Brookings Institution where he discussed recent U.S. trade practice shifts. He gives two important comments. One being, “America now manufactures 10% of the world semiconductors, the rest is geographically concentrated elsewhere. This creates a critical economic risk and a national security vulnerability.” He also stated, “Today the U.S. produces only 4% of the lithium, 13% of the Cobalt, 0% of the nickel, and 0% of the graphite required to meet current demand for EVs. Meanwhile, more than 80% of critical minerals are processed by one country, China. Clean energy supply chains are at risk of being weaponized.” (Sullivan, 2023) In another Brookings speech done by Jake Sullivan in October of this year he stated, “To prevent a second China shock, we’ve had to act. That’s what drove the decisions about our 301 tariffs earlier this year...we chose, instead, to target tariffs at unfair practices in strategic sectors where we and our allies are investing hundreds of billions of dollars to rebuild our manufacturing and our resilience.” (White House, 2024a) In 2018 during the first Trump administration he stated, “On Friday, I announced plans for tariffs on $50 billion worth of imports from China. These tariffs are being imposed to encourage China to change the unfair practices identified in the Section 301 action with respect to technology and innovation.” (White House, 2018) These quotes clearly show that the Chinese threat is the reason why we have seen tariff increases.

According to an article written by China Briefing, they show that the initial tariffs on semiconductors which started in 2018 when the trade war began, was at 25% and a separate article from China Briefing shows that the tariff had increased to 50% under the Biden Administration (Huld, 2024). One of the main purposes of a tariff is to bring domestic manufacturing because the tax on the exported goods would make it more expensive to buy than if you made goods domestically. The U.S. is trying to incentivize domestic semiconductor production in the U.S. by using tariffs because China has built up its military which poses a threat to its neighbors like Taiwan who produce critical items like semiconductors that power our most advanced systems. China Briefing also shows the increase on other goods that are used to make military equipment like battery parts which started at a 7.5% tariff and is now at 25%, lithium-ion batteries which started at a 7.5% tariff and is now at 25%, natural graphite which is at a 25% tariff, and steel and aluminum products which started at a 7.5% tariff and is now at 25%. (Huld, 2024)

This evidence supports this hypothesis that the recent national security threat that China poses through their military buildup is a reason why the United States has recently increased tariffs. On top this, our research may also suggest that Chinese trade practices as indicated by Donald Trump in 2018 may also be a reason for the sudden increase in tariffs.

Hypothesis 2:

The COVID-19 pandemic significantly disrupted global supply chains, leading to extensive logistical challenges, production delays, and shortages across critical sectors. These disruptions exposed weaknesses in global trade networks, displaying the risks of an overreliance on foreign imports for essential goods. We hypothesize that the Biden Administration has redirected U.S. trade policy to incorporate selective tariffs as part of a broader industrial strategy to fortify key domestic supply chains and reduce dependence on international sources. Although tariffs were initially introduced by the previous administration under President Trump, the Biden Administration has not only maintained but, in some cases, expanded these measures—a departure from traditional Democratic views and the 2020 campaign rhetoric of President Biden.

The pandemic exposed significant vulnerabilities in the U.S. supply chain. In The Causal Effects of Global Supply Chain Disruptions on Macroeconomic Outcomes: Evidence and Theory, Xiwen Bai, Jesús Fernández-Villaverde, Yiliang Li, and Francesco Zanetti created an index of global supply chain disruptions. They show that the pandemic caused significant congestion issues. For example, they found that around 80% of inbound ships at the Port of Los Angeles were unable to dock immediately upon arrival in late 2020 (Bai et al., 2024, 12).

The Figure above shows that congestion rates in American ports rose significantly following the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Furthermore, in a 2023 report, the White House states, "In the transportation and logistics industry specifically, a series of supply chain disruptions and delays at ports during the pandemic led to historically high prices for imports to the United States" (White House, 2023). These points effectively establish that COVID-19 disrupted supply chains, particularly imports into the United States.

With the challenges exposed by COVID-19 in focus, the Biden Administration’s rationale for utilizing tariffs to strengthen domestic supply chains becomes evident. In an April 2023 speech at the Brookings Institution, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan outlined the administration's economic agenda, stressing that the American industrial base had been “hollowed out.” Sullivan advocated for a renewed emphasis on domestic production—a rationale supporting tariffs as a means to protect strategic sectors (Sullivan, 2023).

Data from the Office of the United States Trade Representative and reports from the U.S. International Trade Commission further substantiate this strategy. In the USTR’s 2022 and 2023 Trade Policy Agenda and Annual Report, the Biden Administration emphasized supply chain resilience and continued tariffs in sectors deemed critical to national security, including semiconductors, medical equipment, and essential minerals (U.S. Trade Representative, 2023 p. 9). The report remarks, “The pandemic, followed by Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, illustrated the dangers of concentrated supply chains and inadequate consideration of geopolitical risk in sourcing decisions” (U.S. Trade Representative, 2023 p. 9), emphasizing how COVID-19 exposed vulnerabilities that now influence national security policy.

In National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan's speech in April 2023, he states, "A pandemic exposed the fragility of our supply chains," and then goes on to say, "That’s why the United States, under President Biden, is pursuing a modern industrial and innovation strategy— both at home and with partners around the world. One that invests in the sources of our own economic and technological strength, that promotes diversified and resilient global supply chains" (Sullivan, 2023). Sullivan's remarks help us further establish that the Biden Administration is aware of supply chain vulnerability due to COVID and is taking action to address it.

In 2024, the White House issued a press release explaining why they raised tariffs on China. In this release, they stated, "During the pandemic, disruptions to the supply chain, including legacy chips, led to price spikes in a wide variety of products, including automobiles, consumer appliances, and medical devices, underscoring the risks of overreliance on a few markets" (White House, 2024). Again, establishing the overreliance on trade and the need for action. They go on to say, "These tariff rate increases will help support and sustain a strong domestic industrial base for medical supplies that were essential to the COVID-19 pandemic response and continue to be used daily in every hospital across the country to deliver essential care" (White House, 2024). This helps us establish that they are raising tariffs in an attempt to protect supply chains and bolster American industry

The figure above by the Brookings Institution shows a spike in tariff rates between the U.S. and China in 2018, and notably, they remain in place during the Biden Administration. This chart does not include the new tariffs mentioned in the last paragraph.

The Biden Administration’s trade policy, marked by selective tariffs, reflects a strategic response to vulnerabilities in U.S. supply chains exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. Senior officials, such as National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, have emphasized that these tariffs aim to address supply chain deficiencies revealed during the pandemic. This rationale helps explain the continuation and even the expansion of tariffs initially implemented during the Trump administration. However, the hypothesis falters when attempting to explain the origins of Trumpera tariffs, as they predate COVID-19 and cannot be attributed to pandemic-driven concerns. While COVID-19 provides a clear justification for the Biden Administration’s approach, it does not fully account for the decision to uphold nearly all of Trump’s tariffs, suggesting that other factors also influenced their trade strategy.

Hypothesis 3:

For our third and final hypothesis, we delve into Trump’s presidency and his election in 2016, finding his rhetoric and policies evident of a shift towards protectionism. Along with his election, his strategic cabinet and administrative picks furthered the justification of his protectionist rhetoric and “America First” ideology that he implemented in his foreign trade and tariff approach.

Leading up to the 2016 election, Trump strove to distinguish himself from the former Obama presidency. This determination was evident in his rhetoric and language used during his time on the campaign trail. This desire to paint the Obama administration as a failure to thrust his campaign and visions of America into reality was apparent during the first presidential debate of 2016. During the debate against Secretary Clinton, when asked about the break in at the DNC prior, Trump stated,

"whether that was Russia, whether that was China, whether it was another country, we don’t know, because the truth is, under President Obama we’ve lost control of things that we used to have control over" (Staff, 2016).

This pinning of blame on the previous president was deliberately done by Donald Trump to further diminish their legacy in order to propel his campaign further. Especially as this rhetoric was used on national television for the whole world to see, Trump wanted to further distinguish his platform away from the previous administration. Additionally, Trump stated, “we have a trade deficit with all of the countries that we do business with, of almost $800 billion a year. (…) who’s negotiating these trade deals? (…) political hacks negotiating our trade deals” (Staff, 2016). Although the trade deficit in 2015 was closer to $763 billion, this phrasing was meant to shock U.S. citizens and again pin the blame on the former administration for not accomplishing anything to lessen the deficit (Carroll, 2016). Here, we can see the emergence of Trump’s stance of economic populism, to use the imperfect economic status of America as a focal point of his campaign, stated that he will fix it when he is elected as president. As the debate furthered, we can see economic populism when Trump addresses U.S. foreign trade deals. Trump states that,

"especially China. They’re the best, the best ever at it. What they’re doing to us is a very, very sad thing. So we have to do that. We have to renegotiate our trade deals. And, Lester, they’re taking our jobs, they’re giving incentives, they’re doing things that, frankly, we don’t do" (Staff, 2016).

Now, Trump references America’s faltering trade deals with China and implies that when he becomes president, these issues would be resolved. This furthers economic populism and targets trading partners such as China, as the reason behind America’s worsening economy. Trump, as a businessman, naturally views America as a business that should make the most net profit and the lowest cost. This coupled with economic populism and strategic administrative picks, will help reinforce and justify his rhetoric regarding tariffs and foreign trade.

After the 2016 election, President Trump sought to deliver on the promises he made on the campaign trail, especially those relating to economic populism and foreign trade. To help nurture and approve of his protectionist and “America First” ideology, Trump appointed Robert Lighthizer as U.S. Trade Representative. To understand the momentous impacts this administrative pick had on the United State’s protectionist policies, we must first understand why Lighthizer landed the position and how he revolutionized the office of USTR to justify Trump’s extreme policy goals.

Robert Lighthizer, an international trade lawyer, was known for his suing of China for clients representing U.S. Steel, making millions of dollars by protecting intellectual property and enforcing deals (Williamson & Swanson, 2024). He was then hired by President Reagan to serve as the deputy U.S. trade representative. One of his predominant accomplishments under this role was negotiating Japanese trade deals regarding the steel, car, and semiconductor industries. During the negotiations, Lighthizer grew so impatient that he folded their trade deal into a paper airplane and hurled it back to the Japanese negotiators (Williamson & Swanson, 2024). However, by the end of the discussion, Lighthizer had pushed Japan to limit its exportation of these products to the U.S (Williamson & Swanson, 2024). His expansive experience, alongside his support for Trump’s trade rhetoric, landed him the position and provided Trump the legitimacy and expertise needed to further “America First” trade deals. With the position of USTR, Lighthizer utilized a specific tool that was “threatened but never imposed”, that being Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (DePillis, 2020).

China, as the second largest economy, slowly gained the upper hand regarding trade deals with the U.S., leading to an unhealthy deal and reliance on Chinese companies and industries. To counter this, Lighthizer proposed the use of Section 301 of the Trade Act to workaround the inefficiencies of the World Trade Organization (WTO) (CRS, 2024). The WTO and its faulty dispute settlement procedures when it comes to unequal foreign trade deals was ineffective in hindering and reprimanding China for their “hawkish” deals with the U.S. (CRS, 2024). Therefore, by enacting Section 301, Lighthizer proposes that “United States imposes trade sanctions on foreign countries that violate U.S. trade agreements or engage in acts that are ‘unjustifiable’ or ‘unreasonable’ and burden U.S. commerce” (CRS, 2024). Lighthizer used this statute to impose an investigation into primarily China’s trade deals, determine if the deal is onesided, and enact severe punishments such as tariffs on the opposing country (CRS, 2024). These investigations were carried out by the Trump administration six times, two of these six investigations resulting in tariffs on China and the EU (CRS, 2024). The last time an investigation resulted with a retaliation through Section 301 was back in 2009 (CRS, 2024). As a result, in August 2017, the USTR found China guilty of unreasonable trade practices that burdened the U.S. economy, along with theft of intellectual property (CRS, 2024). This resulted in tariffs ranging from 7.5%-25% on around $370 billion of U.S. imports from China, and igniting the trade war between the countries (CRS, 2024). Lighthizer delivered exactly what Trump wanted. Trump wanted to levy favorable trade deals with foreign nations and respond to the large trade deficit left by the administration prior.

"Lighthizer set out on an audacious plan to rebalance American trade relationships around the world, levying sweeping tariffs, hamstringing international institutions, pulling out of agreements and threatening to ditch even more. His boss, a self-styled dealmaker, loved the tactics. Lighthizer delivered what Trump demanded and did it without claiming credit — preserving his post while other White House personnel came and went." (ProPublica, 2020).

Although the appointment of Lighthizer to the Trump administration brought about increased protectionist policies and tariffs on foreign goods, these policies solely impacted the EU and China. It cannot explain the progression of U.S. protectionism, however our previous hypothesis does depict this trend.

Conclusion:

In conclusion, while the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the risks of overreliance on global supply chains and accelerated a focus on domestic resilience, the aggressive military posturing by China under Xi Jinping has served as a pivotal catalyst for tariffs. Both the Trump and Biden administrations have increasingly embraced tariffs, albeit with differing rhetoric, as a tool to counter China's influence and safeguard critical industries. These policies highlight a reorientation of U.S. trade strategy motivated by an attempt to promote national security by fostering economic independence. With Trump’s reelection in the 2024 presidential election and his promise of more tariffs, these protectionist measures will likely continue to play a central role in future American trade policies.

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