The Misunderstood Legacy of “Broken Windows Policing.”

Ethan Gish

Professor Nicholas

RPOS 322

12/10/24

Broken Windows and NYC Policing Practice

Broken Windows Theory is a well-known term but a poorly understood concept. Understandably, many associate the term with Mayor Rudy Giuliani and his “quality of life” initiative for New York City in the mid-90s, which brought a sharp increase in the number of misdemeanor arrests for things like public urination, public alcohol consumption, marijuana possession, prostitution, etc (Onishi). It was widely believed at the time that a failure to control minor offenses like those just listed, led to the destabilization of neighborhoods and an environment of disorder. An environment where the lack of consequences for minor offenses encourages people to commit petty crimes as well as more serious ones. This is the core of broken windows theory, posited by George Kelling and James Wilson in the early 80s, and it is this theory that inspired Mayor Giuliani and Police Commissioner Bratton- as well as police departments across the country- to implement their zero-tolerance enforcement of misdemeanor laws in 1994 (Cerdá). Crime was a major problem in the 80s and 90s, with the entire country was facing historically high crime rates. So when the implementation of Broken Windows policing was followed by a major decrease in crime in NYC, Broken Windows and Giuliani were given credit for it, and both became widely popular among both sides of the political aisle- for a period of time. There has since been much debate over the extent to which broken windows policing actually caused NYC’s drop in crime, and many have voiced ethical concerns over the practice resulting in disproportionate harm to minority populations and frequent instances of police abuse. Interesting to note is the fact that Kelling, one of the authors of Broken Windows, has publicly criticized the way his theory has been implemented in places like NYC because of these issues, adding another layer of nuance to the analysis of this issue. This paper will seek to accurately define broken windows theory and show how it manifested in NYC, as well as analyze its impacts on crime in the context of its impacts on city residents. Only by considering all of these factors can we draw conclusions about the best approach to policing in NYC that makes residents safer and happier.

1. Broken Windows Theory

Broken Windows theory was first proposed in a 1982 paper by Kelling and Wilson and would become widely accepted in policing literature. The theory is based on the idea that “public disorder,” as in acts of disorderly conduct or the appearance of an area looking disorderly and uncared for, leads to more criminal behavior (Kelling and Wilson). This idea was inspired by a field experiment done in 1969 by a Stanford Psychologist who abandoned 2 cars, one in a poor, crime-ridden part of NYC, and the other in an affluent neighborhood of California. After 10 minutes the car in NYC was vandalized and people stripped it for parts. Eventually, its windows were smashed and the car was destroyed. The car in California was untouched for over a week. Then, the researcher smashed the window of the car in California, and shortly after it was also vandalized like the car in NYC. The field study showed how things that clearly look neglected can become the targets of vandalism and disorderly behavior. If it appears that no one cares for a thing- like a car that is left abandoned- then there is no concern about consequences for vandalizing said thing (Wilson and Kelling). Wilson and Kelling thought this concept could be generalized to entire communities. They believed that if there are signs in a community that show “no one cares,” like the presence of graffiti, drug use/dealing, broken windows, public urination, or other types of disorderly conduct, more people will become emboldened to act in undesirable ways and community residents will react by attempting to avoid such disorderly conduct out of fear. They will avoid certain streets or even move out of the area, allowing for the disorderly behavior to perpetuate and worsen, eventually leading to worse crimes. Additionally, as a result of disorderly conduct instilling fear in residents, people start avoiding each other more, weakening the sense of community and the enforcement of acceptable behavior through social norms. Thus, police officers need to be involved in the maintenance of public order and enforcing “desirable behavior” to ensure that communities do not deteriorate as a result of unchecked disorderly behavior. In relation to how officers- a limited resource- should be assigned and what their role should be:

“The key is to identify neighborhoods at the tipping point—where the public order is deteriorating but not unreclaimable, where the streets are used frequently but by apprehensive people, where a window is likely to be broken at any time, and must quickly be fixed if all are not to be shattered… Patrol officers might be encouraged to go to and from duty stations on public transportation and, while on the bus or subway car, enforce rules about smoking, drinking, disorderly conduct, and the like. The enforcement need involve nothing more than ejecting the offender (the offense, after all, is not one with which a booking officer or a judge wishes to be bothered)” (Kelling and Wilson). 

The authors note that giving police officers such wide discretion over how to carry out such a task could lead to officers becoming agents of “neighborhood bigotry,” and they could come up with no answer for how to ensure this does not happen. Comments like these, as well as the authors’ views on how cops should carry out this task, show a stark contrast in what Broken Windows theory proposed, and what was actually implemented in NYC.  

2. Broken Windows in NYC

Mayor Giuliani would implement Broken Windows policing in 1994 via aggressive enforcement of misdemeanor laws. One of the first changes made under this new policing strategy was to change procedures for issuing Criminal Court Summonses, as the vast majority of people issued summonses would simply not show up to court. By arresting repeat violators and imposing consequences on those who don’t show up to court, the city believed they would deter people from evading summonses and thus indirectly reduce disorderly behavior (Onishi). In terms of how cops were being assigned, according to a New York Times article from 1994 when these changes were being made:

“Last month Police Commissioner William J. Bratton announced that more than 100 police officers would be assigned to the full-time task of rounding up truant teen-agers and sending them back into classrooms. Truancy, the police said, contributed to youth violence ranging from purse-snatchings to drug-related shootings” (Onishi).

The article further illustrates an aggressive enforcement approach in its summary of comments made by Commissioner Bratton, who “criticized some police officers for being complacent, exhorting them to be more aggressive in fighting even minor problems on the streets. (Onishi). 

Broken Windows policing in NYC doesn’t just involve increased misdemeanor arrests, but also Mayor Bloomberg’s introduction of stop-and-frisk. Before it was ruled unconstitutional in 2013 for being racially discriminatory- a violation of the 14th amendment- and violating New Yorkers’ 4th amendment rights (Benz), cops had the authority to temporarily detain individuals they believed were, or will be involved in criminal behavior, and “frisk” the individual by patting them down if the officer believed they could have a weapon. At the peak of the policy in 2011, there were 685,724 stops done by NYPD, 88% of which had no outcome (NYCLU, 2019). Of the millions of stops made between 2002 and 2023, 53% of stops involved a frisk, 23% involved the use of force, and 12% resulted in an arrest or summons (NYCLU). Futhermore, 84% of those stopped were Black or Latino, and weapons/contraband were recovered less than 2% of the time despite discovering weapons/contraband being the stated purpose of the policy (Benz), and despite stops on white individuals finding contraband at a higher rates (CCR).

3. Broken Windows and Crime Rates

As previously mentioned, Broken Windows policing in NYC has often been credited for the city’s substantial decrease in crime, but the research shows mixed results. According to a study on Broken Windows Theory in NYC by Cerda et al. which analyzed the policy based on misdemeanor arrests and how they impacted firearm homicides using data from 1990-1999, found that an increase of 5,000 misdemeanor arrests was associated with a modest reduction of 3.5 homicides. However, the study found that “physical order” was unrelated to homicide and higher misdemeanor arrests were associated with lower physical order (Cerda, 1). This pokes a hole in the logic behind Broken Windows which states that a lack of order in a neighborhood will lead to increased crime. Homicide at least, seems to be excluded from this hypothetical crime increase. The study was unable to determine the cause for the dramatic crime decrease in the U.S., but pointed to the waning of the crack epidemic and changes in policing- like increased numbers of officers- as possible contributors. Another study titled, “Carrots, Sticks, and Broken Windows,” sought to determine the role of economic and deterrence factors in NYC’s crime drop, while testing the Broken Windows hypothesis. They found that a “10 percent increase in misdemeanor arrests decreases motor vehicle thefts by 1.6 to 2.1 percent, robberies by 2.5 to 3.2 percent, and grand larcenies by .5 to .6 percent” (Corman and Mocan, 21). Given that the misdemeanor arrest rate increased by 72%, they estimate that it was responsible for 14%, 21%, and 4% of the total decrease in motor vehicle theft, robbery, and grand larceny, with no impact on murder, burglary, or assault. Arrests for felonies had the largest effect on felony crimes, and the authors noted that even though the effects of Broken Windows are statistically significant on some crimes, they are not universally significant or “of great magnitude” (Corman and Mocan, 29). Other cities also experienced significant declines in crime who didn’t enact Broken Windows policing, like Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco, who “experienced decreases in index crime rates of 50 percent, 56 percent, and 41 percent, respectively, compared with the 58 percent decline in NYC. In contrast, misdemeanor arrests declined in the three counties containing these cities” (Corman and Mocan, 29). Based on the study’s model, if the three cities had increased their misdemeanor arrests by 70% they would have seen an additional 10% reduction in crime, bringing their numbers more in line with New York’s. The study concludes with comments on the costs of significant increases in misdemeanor arrests, namely the negative impact on civil liberties, particularly for minorities, and the economic impact of more individuals having arrest records. Findings from, “Disorder policing to reduce crime: A systematic review,” by Braga et al., further support the idea that Broken Windows policing in NYC was not the main driver in bringing down crime. They found that policing disorder was associated with statistically significant and modest reductions in crime, but only based on the approach to policing disorder. 

“The strongest program effect sizes were generated by community and problem‐solving interventions designed to change social and physical disorder conditions at particular places. Conversely, aggressive order maintenance strategies that target disorderly behaviors by individuals in specific areas did not generate significant crime reductions” (Braga et al.).

4. Broken Windows and NYC Residents

Based on the available research, it seems hard to argue that NYC’s implementation of Broken Windows was as effective as many have claimed over the years. However, it probably wouldn’t be accurate to say it did nothing to reduce crime. Regardless, its potential benefits on crime are far outweighed by the impacts it had on the residents of NYC. According to a survey done by the New York Civil Liberties Union, 67% of NYC residents in highly policed communities feared having a friend or family member killed by NYPD, 85% “said they actively changed things about their behavior, relationships, use of space, or schedule to avoid police surveillance,” 41% reported experiencing “extreme physical force” by the police in comparison to 4% of residents in lightly policed communities, and 16% reported at least one incident of sexual harrassment by an NYPD officer compared to 5% of those in lightly policed neighborhoods (NYCLU, 2018). The difference in treatment NYPD officers give to those in certain communities is so widely understood, that the term, New York’s “tale of two cities,” is widespread in discussions about policing in NYC. On top of the stop-and-frisk data cited earlier in this paper, which showed an immensely disproportionate stopping of minorities despite them being less likely to be in possession of a weapon or contriband, this data makes it clear that New York’s pursuit of Broken Windows policing has negatively impacted New Yorkers to a far greater degree than it reduced crime.

Concluding Thoughts

Firstly, it’s important to note that NYC’s version of Broken Windows is not what the theory’s authors had in mind. In an interview, Kelling stated:

"When, during the 1990s, I would occasionally read in a newspaper something like a new chief comes in and says, 'I'm going to implement broken windows tomorrow,' I would listen to that with dismay because [it's] a highly discretionary activity by police that needs extensive training, formal guidelines, constant monitoring and oversight. So do I worry about the implementation about broken windows? A whole lot ... because it can be done very badly" (Vedantam).

It was done very badly in New York. Officers became “agents of neighborhood bigotry” just as Kelling and Wilson worried could happen, and the real impacts it had on crime were not worth the downsides it had on city residents. This doesn’t mean though that policing disorder is a waste of an idea. It is important that residents feel safe in their communities, and the streets of NYC do often hold individuals engaged in “undesirable behavior” that can make one uncomfortable, particularly in the subways. Considering the fact that the systematic review by Braga et al. does find evidence for policing disorder to work, just not the aggressive approach of NYC, NYPD doesn’t completely have to start from scratch on its policing strategy. But in order to address crime with a more scientific approach, NYPD needs to start being actually involved in the community, and move away from current policing practice which comes across as hostile toward residents. Cops should not get most of their interaction with civilians during stops, they need to build relations with store owners, community leaders, and regulars who walk the streets every day to work. As is mentioned in Kelling and Wilson’s original paper, this sort of policing leads residents to feel more safe, and when there is a better relationship between the police and city residents, residents are more likely to assist police when they see crimes or disorderly behavior occuring. At the moment, NYPD seems to prioritize the appearance of being tough on crime over following the science and ensuring residents don’t feel persecuted in their own community for simply living their life. That reality is unacceptable and must change.

Works Cited

Benz, Dorothee, and David Lerner. “Landmark Decision: Judge Rules NYPD Stop and Frisk Practices Unconstitutional, Racially Discriminatory.” Center for Constitutional Rights, 12 Aug. 2013, ccrjustice.org/home/press-center/press-releases/landmark-decision-judge-rules-nypd-stop-and-frisk-practices.

Braga, Anthony A., et al. “Disorder policing to reduce crime: A systematic review.” Campbell Systematic Reviews, vol. 15, no. 3, Sept. 2019, https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1050.

Cerdá, Magdalenaa, and al et. “Misdemeanor Policing, Physical Disorder, and Gun-Related... : Epidemiology.” LWW, Epidemiology , July 2009, journals.lww.com/epidem/fulltext/2009/07000/misdemeanor_policing,_physical_disorder,_and.11.aspx.

Chauhan, Preeti. “Race/Ethnic-Specific Homicide Rates in New York City: Evaluating the Impact of Broken Windows Policing and Crack Cocaine Markets.” PubMed Central, U.S. National Library of Medicine, 15 Aug. 2011, pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC3275435/.

Corman, Hope, and Naci Mocan. “Carrots, sticks, and broken windows.” The Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 48, no. 1, Apr. 2005, pp. 235–266, https://doi.org/10.1086/425594.

“NYPD Stop-and-Frisk Statistics 2009 and 2010.” Center for Constitutional Rights, ccrjustice.org/files/CCR_Stop_and_Frisk_Fact_Sheet_0.pdf. Accessed 11 Dec. 2024.

Onishi, Norimitsu. “Police Announce Crackdown on Quality-of-Life Offenses.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 13 Mar. 1994, www.nytimes.com/1994/03/13/nyregion/police-announce-crackdown-on-quality-of-life-offenses.html.

“Shattered: The Continuing, Damaging, and Disparate Legacy of Broken Windows Policing in New York City (2018).” NYCLU, 12 Apr. 2024, www.nyclu.org/report/shattered-continuing-damaging-and-disparate-legacy-broken-windows-policing-new-york.

“Stop-and-Frisk Data.” NYCLU, 14 Mar. 2019, www.nyclu.org/data/stop-and-frisk-data.

Vedantam, Shankar, et al. “How a Theory of Crime and Policing Was Born, and Went Terribly Wrong.” NPR, NPR, 1 Nov. 2016, www.npr.org/2016/11/01/500104506/broken-windows-policing-and-the-origins-of-stop-and-frisk-and-how-it-went-wrong.

Wilson, James  Q., and George  L. Kelling. “Broken Windows.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, Mar. 1982, www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/.